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Executive Summary
Around the world, governments and non-state actors are using sophisticated 
techniques to monitor, threaten, and harass human rights defenders (HRDs) and 
journalists. The growing use of digital technology has empowered activists to 
rally citizens around common causes and hold governments accountable, but 
it has also opened new doors for surveillance and harassment of activists and 
citizens’ activities online. On November 14–15, 2013, Freedom House, funded by 
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), held a global 
conference in Mexico City entitled “What Next? The Quest to Protect Journalists 
and Human Rights Defenders in a Digital World,”1 which brought together over 
60 policymakers, donors, and activists to explore the full range of emerging 
threats and best strategies to overcome them; take an honest look at what is 
and is not working; and chart a path forward for more proactive and realistic 
solutions to build the resilience, sustainability, and relevance of HRDs and their 
movements. The conference sought to answer “what’s next?” by identifying 
opportunities that can be exploited to build up frontline defenders and their 
ability to uphold human rights principles fearlessly and strategically at home 
and abroad.
Among the key findings were the following:
• HRDs are facing a shifting political landscape in 
which restrictions against their work rapidly evolve 
and threats arise from state and non-state actors. 
To push their agenda ahead, HRDs, implementers, 
and donors must focus on contingency planning 
and put systems in place to prevent attacks and 
reprisals rather than responding after the fact. 
• Digital security tools are useless if they are not 
introduced with proper accompaniment so that 
trainers can assess beneficiaries’ needs and risk 
profiles, and help activists think robustly about 
changing their online and offline behavior and 
implementing protocols to safeguard themselves. 
Donor funds should be geared towards replicating 
and localizing existing tools and making sure 
they are used responsibly, rather than creating 
new tools. 
www.freedomhouse.org
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• Activists face a range of threats that go beyond 
digital attacks, including physical threats and 
intimidation that can also cause psycho-social 
harm, as well as legal and fiscal restrictions that 
require specialized counsel. Security trainers need 
to build up a minimum of knowledge in all of these 
areas in order to effectively strengthen activists’ 
self-protection capabilities.
• Collaboration is essential to get ahead of the game, 
and almost 100 percent of implementers surveyed 
indicated that they will collaborate in some form 
with others. However, most of these implementers 
indicated that barriers, including distrust among 
CSOs and donor policies that disincentivize 
collaboration, often make collaboration difficult. 
The following recommendations emerged from 
the findings: 
• HRDs should systematize what they learn in 
security trainings to be proactive when thinking 
about their security and that of their organizations. 
They should also replicate what they learned with 
others in their network and be inclusive by sharing 
these tactics more broadly with those who may 
be at risk, including women HRDs, LGBTI groups, 
youth activists, and other communities facing 
similar challenges.
• Activists should harness technology and the arts to 
build public support for their human rights causes, 
create self-protection networks, and seek allies to 
avoid being isolated by authoritarians. 
• Implementers should invest resources into 
establishing a more holistic approach to 
security training and assistance that addresses 
HRDs’ physical, digital, psycho-social, and 
other vulnerabilities. 
• Implementers and donors must “walk the talk” 
on security by incorporating security protocols 
into their own internal practices. For donors, 
walking the talk also means never shying away 
from publicly espousing human rights principles 
as a core of foreign policy and development aid, 
and as a key talking point when engaging with 
repressive regimes. 
• Donors and implementers should focus less on 
funding new digital security tools and more on 
training HRDs in the use of existing tools, with an 
emphasis on changing behaviors that put them at 
risk and thinking proactively about contingency 
planning and security protocols.
• Donors should use coordinated bilateral 
engagements with countries in which HRDs and 
other targeted populations are under attack to 
stress the state’s responsibility to protect these 
populations. Foreign assistance to these countries 
should be conditioned on, and provide support 
for, their implementation of measures to protect 
targeted populations.
• Donors should restructure funding policies to 
prioritize and integrate security in all programming 
and incentivize collaboration among donors 
and implementers.
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Overview
Around the world, governments and non-state actors 
are using sophisticated techniques to monitor, 
threaten, and harass human rights defenders (HRDs) 
and journalists. The growing use of digital technology 
has empowered activists to rally citizens around 
common causes and hold governments accountable, 
but it has also opened new doors for surveillance and 
harassment of activists and citizens’ activities online. 
With support from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID), Freedom House held a global 
conference in Mexico City on November 14–15, 2013, 
entitled “What Next? The Quest to Protect Journalists 
and Human Rights Defenders in a Digital World,”2 
which brought together over 60 policymakers, donors, 
and activists to explore the full range of emerging 
threats and best strategies to overcome them; take an 
honest look at what is and is not working; and chart a 
path forward for more proactive and realistic solutions 
to build the resilience, sustainability, and relevance of 
HRDs and their movements. Participants engaged in 
highly interactive discussions and exercises designed 
to elicit collaborative and innovative answers to 
“what’s next?” by identifying opportunities that can 
be exploited to build up frontline defenders and their 
ability to uphold human rights principles fearlessly and 
strategically at home and abroad. The host location 
of Mexico provided a perfect backdrop to address 
these questions as the location of one of Freedom 
House’s largest programs bolstering protections for 
journalists.3 This report summarizes the key findings 
and proposes recommendations from the conference. 
“Urlaub 2005 – México” by  
http://www.flickr.com/photos/schlaeger/ is licensed 
under http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0.
www.freedomhouse.org
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Rationale
As illustrated in Freedom House’s Freedom in the 
World 2014 report, global freedom has been in decline 
for eight consecutive years. This is due in part to 
the rise of authoritarian internationalism,4 in which 
authoritarians increasingly collaborate in order to roll 
back internationally accepted human rights norms, 
at home and abroad, that stand in the way of their 
efforts to concentrate power and satiate the interests 
of elites. 
On the domestic front, authoritarians trade worst 
practices to restrict HRDs that seek to hold 
them accountable, including sharing surveillance 
technologies and intimidation tactics, as well as 
sophisticated legal and fiscal restrictions to criminalize 
civil society organizations (CSOs) and restrict freedom 
of expression, assembly, and association. In response, 
the U.S. and other democratic countries have sought 
to support HRDs in pushing back against these 
restrictions. However, the latest revelations of the 
U.S. government’s mass surveillance programs have 
put into question the prevalence and purpose of 
surveillance by democratic states, hurt U.S. credibility 
as a proponent of Internet freedom, and strengthened 
claims of a double standard by authoritarians who 
purport they too surveil HRD activity because of 
national security.
To avoid complying with human rights standards 
that check their authority on the international stage, 
authoritarians also seek to undermine the jurisdiction 
of international and regional institutions, as recent 
attacks against the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights and Kenya’s efforts to withdraw from 
the International Criminal Court illustrate. While 
authoritarian voices are united in challenging the 
authority and legitimacy of international mechanisms 
that might hold them accountable, democratic 
countries are at best ambiguous about investing in 
these institutions and, at worst, complicit in asserting 
that the international community should not interfere 
in domestic affairs. Authoritarian regimes also play 
on the non-intervention principle to criminalize 
international cooperation and foreign assistance 
to HRDs, as evidenced by the termination of direct 
USAID and other donor programming in Russia, Bolivia, 
and elsewhere. Unfortunately, many democratic 
countries have failed to push back on these creeping 
restrictions, and to articulate a response that 
reinforces human rights promotion as an essential 
core of their foreign policy and development strategies. 
While authoritarian regimes are emboldened to 
pursue unchecked power and avoid domestic 
and international accountability, HRDs and their 
democratic supporters around the world are 
struggling to promote universal human rights, retain 
popular support for these values, and uphold the 
responsibility of the international community to hold 
governments accountable to these norms. Many 
human rights activists and international support 
groups are vulnerable, underfunded, and adrift on 
how to safely, sustainably, and effectively advance 
their causes—and protect themselves while doing 
so. Although international donors and human 
rights organizations, including Front Line Defenders, 
Freedom House, and many others, offer rapid response 
emergency assistance that provides a vital lifeline to 
HRDs and CSOs under attack, emergency support 
funding is limited and, therefore, primarily reactive and 
short-term. Moreover, so long as foreign donors do 
not engage in forceful diplomatic challenges against 
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authoritarian laws criminalizing foreign assistance, 
CSOs risk reprisal when they accept financing and 
support from these donors. 
Many HRDs have found innovative ways to stay safe 
in the face of attacks, fight back against restrictions, 
and gain popular support for their causes. However, 
although international solidarity exists among those 
advancing human rights, the human rights community 
has not tapped into its comparative expertise and 
lessons learned to capture these success stories and 
use them to put forth proactive and holistic protection 
strategies to build the resilience, sustainability, and 
relevance of HRDs and their networks. In response, 
Freedom House sought to answer the following 
question: What have we learned from the latest wave 
of authoritarianism, and how do we use what we 
learned to get ahead of the game and ensure the 
survival and sustainability of human rights and those 
working to advance them? During the conference, we 
set out to pursue the following objectives:
• To better understand how practices and 
policies by foreign donors, implementers, and 
HRDs themselves inadvertently make them 
more vulnerable.
• To articulate proactive, achievable, and 
relevant solutions to tackle the digital, physical, 
psychological, and other vulnerabilities of HRDs, 
including women, youth, and LGBTI HRDs.
• To craft a roadmap that lays out strategic 
parameters to overcome the vulnerabilities and 
exploit the strengths of HRDs, including women, 
youth, and LGBTI HRDs.
www.freedomhouse.org
Freedom House
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Findings
Emerging Threats
In recent years, journalists, human rights defenders, 
and activists around the world have harnessed the 
many advances in online and digital technology to 
better organize citizens, promote transparency, and 
hold governments accountable to universal human 
rights standards. In response, those governments 
around the world who feel threatened by being judged 
by such standards have unleashed restrictions on 
freedom of expression, assembly, and association, and 
they are becoming more 
sophisticated and tech 
savvy in their efforts 
to monitor, threaten, 
and harass activists, 
particularly in the 
aftermath of the Arab 
Spring. In collaboration 
with like-minded 
governments and 
transnational companies, 
authoritarian regimes 
are employing advanced 
hacking and surveillance 
practices, coupled with traditional intimidation tactics. 
Efforts to restrict and even demonize human rights 
work have left HRDs vulnerable to physical, rhetorical, 
and online attacks (including slander, beatings, death 
threats, and killings). Repressive regimes are also 
employing certain traditional cultural values that 
undermine any non-domestic role by women to 
undercut the work and safety of women HRDs. As 
documented in Freedom of the Press and Freedom on 
the Net, governments are becoming more aggressive 
in their tactics to crowd out spaces for free expression 
in traditional and online media. Such governments are 
also imposing sophisticated fiscal and legal burdens, 
including onerous registration and tax regulations and 
restrictions on funding sources, to make it impossible 
for CSOs to operate and garner much-needed 
foreign assistance.
Activists in rural settings and/or closed societies 
where Internet access was once restricted are starting 
to have greater access to the Internet in recent years, 
but many of them are ill-equipped and uninformed 
about the risks they face online, or continue to 
face gender-based constraints on access to the 
Internet. The feeling of being free online for first-
time Internet users can lead to risky online behavior 
that undermines their security. Using popular but 
unsecured applications, such as Skype, WhatsApp, 
and BlackBerry Messenger, as well as social media 
sites like Twitter and Facebook, have become second 
nature for many activists who do not realize the extent 
to which these sites can expose their identity, location, 
and other sensitive information. From crackdowns 
against microbloggers in China to killings and death 
threats against citizen journalists in Mexico, online 
novices are under attack and unaware of potential 
assistance and support they can receive from 
traditional HRDs and international support groups. 
In Latin America and other regions, many of these 
threats and acts of violence are originating from 
non-state actors, including organized crime. While 
in some countries, such as Mexico and Colombia, 
governments are beginning to publicly acknowledge 
their responsibility to protect citizens against these 
threats and implementing protection laws and state 
protection mechanisms, a history of widespread 
impunity in these countries undermines the credibility 
of these efforts. 
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In repressive regimes where the state is the primary 
source of attacks against HRDs, it is unfortunately 
common for citizens to be apathetic, or worse, 
supportive of government efforts to curtail and 
repress human rights activism. At times, HRDs 
pursue effective international advocacy to hold 
their governments accountable to human rights 
norms but struggle to mobilize domestic support 
for human rights at the grassroots, resulting in low 
public approval or interest in their efforts. In many 
countries, particularly those with high anti-West 
sentiment, government-led smear campaigns paint 
HRDs as elite, Western-funded interest groups that do 
not represent the daily concerns or values of citizens, 
or as troublemakers causing social unrest. In the 
face of government-led efforts to discredit their work 
and an onslaught of intimidation and violence, many 
HRDs are constantly under attack, are struggling to 
remain active, and are being challenged by public 
attitudes to demonstrate that their activism is relevant 
and valuable. 
As youth activists, women’s groups, and the LGBTI 
community become better organized to advance 
their rights, they are also becoming the target of 
attacks. In many conservative societies, women and 
LGBTI activists are not only subject to attacks from 
governments but also from the general public that 
do not view their universal human rights claims as 
legitimate and are resistant to allowing them a voice 
and a space to articulate and demand such rights. As 
a result, they are marginalized and prone to violence 
and harassment. In many countries, youth activists 
have been at the forefront of social protests and, as a 
result, are prime targets of government crackdowns. 
While youth activists are adept at using social media 
and other tactics to organize en masse, many of them 
lack the skills or resources to protect themselves 
effectively when they come under attack. Conference 
participants found that many of these challenges, as 
well as the unique tactics that these groups have 
employed to confront attacks, are underrepresented 
in discussions on HRDs. Traditional HRDs have little 
awareness or understanding of the diverse challenges 
and vulnerabilities that these emerging groups face, 
and there is scarce collaboration or exchange of 
best practices between these groups and traditional 
HRD communities. Moreover, a tendency to refer to 
these groups as “vulnerable populations” is not only 
disempowering but also fails to reflect the strength 
and resilience these communities have exhibited in 
the face of reprisals and lack of public understanding 
or empathy. Thus, fostering greater collaboration 
and understanding between these populations and 
traditional HRDs will not only help to mainstream 
understanding about these communities and 
their needs but also offer traditional HRDs fresh 
approaches on how to pursue strategies that are 
innovative, resilient, and sustainable.
Challenges and Gaps in Protection Efforts
Conference participants identified the following 
challenges and gaps in protection efforts to overcome 
the emerging threats described above.
• Protection efforts are reactive. Participants 
recognized that one of the principal challenges to 
overcoming and protecting against the emerging 
threats is that HRDs, implementers, and donors 
alike realize the importance of security after they or 
a colleague, partner, or grantee are under attack (at 
which point their identity, work, communications, 
etc., may already be compromised). Although the 
international donor community has provided more 
funding in recent years for security training and 
assistance, beneficiaries seek help once they have 
been the subject of an attack. Most organizations 
providing assistance, either in the form of security 
training and/or emergency assistance, end up 
focused on helping beneficiaries respond to and 
prevent further attacks, rather than on preventative 
contingency and security planning to build 
resilience and establish protocols to avoid attacks 
in the first place. Building such protection capacity 
within segments of local human rights movements, 
as Protection International has done, is the 
exception for now. 
• It is difficult to keep up in the digital arms race. 
Recognizing the potential risks and opportunities 
brought on by online organizing in the aftermath 
of the Arab Spring, donors have focused greater 
resources in recent years on digital security. With 
these resources, practitioners and technologists 
have created useful and innovative tools to protect 
HRDs, journalists, and other activist groups 
online (some of the latest were showcased in 
the conference, see page 16). The growing use 
of mobile technology around the world presents 
both opportunities and challenges to addressing 
the security needs of HRDs using smart and 
“dumb” phones for activism and is becoming an 
important component of digital security. However, 
implementers struggle to keep digital and mobile 
tools up to date and relevant in the midst of a 
www.freedomhouse.org
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rapidly changing digital landscape and evolving 
digital attacks. In the race to keep up, many 
developers create tools for other developers 
without paying sufficient attention to user-centric 
design or, most importantly, the on-the-ground 
needs of local HRDs. As a result, local activists are 
overwhelmed by the complexity of online security 
tools and resistant to using them in their daily work, 
even when they are aware of the risks of using less-
secure applications. 
• There is too much focus on the tools rather 
than the training. Digital security practitioners 
recognize that there is no one-stop shop or “magic 
button” to make HRDs secure. Digital security tools 
are useless if they are not introduced with proper 
accompaniment and training so that trainers can 
assess beneficiaries’ local needs, environments, 
and risk profiles to tailor their training and the 
tools they should use to meet those needs. Most 
importantly, trainings to introduce digital security 
tools are meant to help HRDs assess the level of 
risk they are facing and help them to think robustly 
about how to change their online and offline 
behavior and protocols to safeguard themselves, 
those around them, their work, and their 
organizations. For instance, the Hancel application5 
showcased during the conference prompts 
journalists to think about their emergency contacts 
as part of planning an assignment in a high-risk 
area and to create networks with colleagues and 
organizations that can respond in case of an attack. 
The contingency planning involved in using the 
application is just as useful as the application itself 
and, in fact, essential. Tools like Hancel depend on 
having an infrastructure of people on the ground 
who are able and willing to intercede when an HRD 
comes under attack or is in danger, and is tailored 
to environments where mobile technology is 
prevalent and where people networks are in place. 
Employing such a tool in environments that lack 
the technology and 
adequate “people 
backup” could 
generate a false 
sense of confidence. 
Thus, while HRDs 
need greater access 
to digital security 
tools and technology, 
it is irresponsible to 
disseminate tools 
without proper 
training to elevate HRDs’ overall understanding 
of what puts them at risk and what systems and 
networks they should put in place to mitigate those 
risks. However, donors are focused on funding the 
latest tools, instead of “less attractive” trainings 
to support the responsible use of existing digital 
security tools and practices and efforts to localize 
and build the essential local support structures 
within civil society that these tools depend 
upon. Successful digital security training implies 
long-term engagement, but even when funding is 
available, it is often short-term, leaving little time for 
a sustainable impact.
• A holistic understanding of security is missing. 
Practitioners focused on protection strategies 
and assistance for HRDs and other targeted 
groups recognize that while recent funding efforts 
have centered on digital security, a more holistic 
approach to security is critical to overcoming HRD 
vulnerabilities. Activists face a range of threats 
that go beyond digital surveillance and attacks, 
including physical threats and intimidation that 
can also cause psycho-social harm, as well as 
legal and fiscal restrictions that require specialized 
counsel. For instance, an intrepid blogger that 
is adroit in encryption and other digital security 
tactics can easily become the target of a smear 
campaign if incriminating photos are published 
of him or her with a sensitive partner or donor, 
or be the victim of a physical attack if he or she 
does not take precautions when walking alone 
after meetings. Such attacks or reprisals can 
have significant long-term effects on an activist’s 
well-being. Implementers are beginning to realize 
the importance of breaking the variety of risks 
down in an activist-oriented manner and providing 
holistic training and assistance that addresses 
beneficiaries’ physical, digital, and psycho-social 
vulnerabilities and capacities. However, few 
trainers and resources exist that can address all of 
these elements cohesively. There is a minimum of 
knowledge that physical, digital, and psycho-social 
support trainers need to have about one another’s 
work in order to effectively carry out their own work, 
i.e., a digital security trainer must be aware of how 
high stress or trauma may affect the ways in which 
her workshop participants will learn. Similarly, a 
physical security trainer should be aware of the 
possible consequences of an HRD carrying a 
smartphone at all times, even to sensitive missions 
or meetings, supposedly as a security measure. 
While digital and physical security providers are 
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starting to collaborate, psycho-social security 
remains the most underdeveloped component of 
protection strategies, as much less is known about 
these vulnerabilities and about knowledgeable 
experts and resources to address them. In 
some countries, there is also a stigma attached 
to receiving help for psycho-social trauma. In 
order to develop a holistic approach to security, 
implementers will need to ensure that their trainers 
know a minimum about each area to do their work 
well and ensure they are backed up by experts 
in the protection field, and donors will need to 
understand the costs and time needed to recruit 
talent with such a specialized skill set.
• Collaboration is essential to get ahead of 
the game, but barriers make it unworkable. 
Collaboration is essential if activists, implementers, 
and donors want to find realistic and proactive 
solutions to protect human rights work and 
those advancing these rights from sophisticated 
attacks by authoritarians who collaborate with 
each other as well. In the digital security space, 
technologists are familiar with the benefits of 
using open-sourcing, crowdsourcing, and other 
collaborative tactics to find innovative solutions 
to security challenges. As illustrated by Front 
Line Defenders/Tactical Technology Collective’s 
“Security in-a-box,”6 a collection of hands-on digital 
security guides tailored to the needs of a diverse 
range of activists, some of the best protection tools 
are the product of collaboration between two or 
more organizations. In fact, almost 100 percent 
of implementers surveyed after the conference 
indicated that they will collaborate in some form 
or another with other implementers. However, 
participants admitted that there are many barriers 
that make collaboration difficult and unrealistic. At 
the local level, egos and clan-like behavior among 
activists and those who support them make it 
difficult to get actors to rally around common 
objectives to make their work more secure. Many 
HRDs define their community in narrow terms. So, 
when journalists, LGBTI advocates, peasant groups, 
women’s groups, etc., are the victims of attacks, 
seasoned HRDs do not assume responsibility for 
their safety as they do not consider these actors 
to be HRDs in the traditional sense. There is also 
widespread mistrust between activists in the 
Global South and the North, with activists from 
the South feeling mis- or under-represented and 
those in the North underestimating the capacity 
of those in the South. As a result, security tools 
and protocols, primarily instituted by implementers 
from the North, are not always informed by 
on-the-ground experiences of local activists. Donor 
procurement policies also discourage rather than 
encourage collaboration (i.e., by requiring a lead 
in consortia). Donor procurement policies are 
also structured around minimizing their own risks, 
with few donors assuming any degree of liability 
for the projects they fund in sensitive political 
environments. These policies and practices must 
change in order to incentivize collaboration among 
and between donors, implementers, and activists. 
www.freedomhouse.org
Freedom House
9
Recommendations
The following recommendations arose from 
the  discussions.
Activists should:
• Be proactive. If activists are to get ahead of the 
game, they must be vigilant about their security. 
Activists must realize that using digital security 
tools is just one part of changing their routines in 
order to think ahead and put security protocols and 
contingency plans in place to mitigate potential 
threats. Activists should advocate to donors and 
implementers to integrate security assistance 
into all programming. HRDs should work with 
implementers and donors to establish security 
protocols and contingency planning as routine 
exercises that are integrated into their strategic 
planning about their work and organizations, 
particularly during moments of escalated 
violence or impending CSO restrictions that can 
potentially impact their operating environment. 
For instance, before staging protests, organizers 
should prepare contingency plans to address 
potential physical and digital attacks. Likewise, 
before organizing in advance of an election, groups 
should strategize about their response to diverse 
electoral scenarios and possible electoral violence. 
Protection International’s work with The Human 
Rights Defenders Protection Unit (UDEFEGUA) in 
Guatemala, East and Horn of Africa Human Rights 
Defenders Project (EHAHRDP) in East and Horn of 
Africa, and Arus Pelangi in Indonesia can serve as 
examples of such an approach. 
• Wash, rinse, repeat. Improving security 
management is a matter of behavioral and 
organizational change. The only way to ensure 
that security trainings have a sustainable impact 
on the ground is for activists to internalize and 
systematize what they learn in their own work 
and that of their organizations and then share 
what they learned with others. Implementing 
physical and digital security protocols should 
become second nature to HRDs as part and parcel 
of carrying out their daily work, as well as part 
of their overall efforts to maintain sustainability 
and resilience in the face of potential or ongoing 
attacks. HRDs equipped with security training 
should work with implementers and donors to 
replicate that knowledge and raise awareness 
about the importance of security planning among 
their networks and the greater public.
• Get to the source. Activists should work with 
international supporters to identify the sources of 
digital spyware and name and shame corporations 
that are providing surveillance technology to 
repressive regimes. They should also advocate 
against these practices and lobby for technology 
providers to revisit their policies to ensure 
they are not endangering activists’ identities 
or collaborating with repressive practices in 
authoritarian countries. Google’s “Good to 
Know” website,7 which shares useful digital 
security tips, and its “Digital Attack Map,”8 which 
illustrates Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) 
attacks around the world, show a willingness by 
some companies to be partners in promoting 
digital security. 
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• Go after the perpetrators. Activists should 
avail themselves of international human rights 
mechanisms to seek legal recourse against 
the perpetrators of attacks. In some cases, 
participants shared success stories in which they 
were able to bring cases in international human 
rights institutions against their governments for 
perpetrating attacks against them. As the cases of 
Mexico and Colombia illustrate, some governments 
have publicly acknowledged their responsibility to 
protect against and prosecute attacks by state and 
non-state actors and are taking measures, albeit 
with modest results, to put protection mechanisms 
in place for journalists and other activists.
• Build public support. HRDs should avoid being 
isolated, smeared, and typecast by government 
authorities seeking to discredit them and leave 
them vulnerable to attacks. HRDs should seek to 
build domestic public support for their human 
rights causes by focusing on issues that matter 
to ordinary citizens and crafting messages that 
resonate with broader audiences. Conference 
participants shared success stories of how they 
turned to social media to raise domestic and 
international support and attention to attacks 
against HRDs. For instance, in Cuba, which has 
one of the lowest Internet penetration rates in the 
world, Twitter campaigns calling for the release 
of activists that are arbitrarily detained often 
lead to their release by the government, which, 
despite its repressive tactics, cares deeply about 
its international image. Some activists, such as 
those trained by participating organization Videre 
Est Credere, have used new technologies to build 
constituencies of support by exposing the public to 
extreme cases of bigotry and harassment through 
secret filming. In Mexico, Freedom House has 
supported films and other initiatives to increase 
support and empathy among average citizens in 
favor of the protection and survival of journalists. 
Conference participants also shared how they have 
used arts spaces effectively to engage broader 
audiences in human rights dialogues, as in the case 
of Picha Mtaani in Kenya (see photo below). By 
In Kenya, Picha 
Mtaani organized 
a photo exhibit to 
inspire reflection 
and dialogue among 
citizens, using 
shocking images 
that raised alarm 
around the world 
of the violence that 
plagued the country’s 
2007 election.
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seeking an inclusive approach to promoting human 
rights—and tapping into social media, the arts, and 
other spaces to engage broader audiences—HRDs 
can gain widespread public support for their causes 
and overcome the isolation that can make them 
vulnerable to reprisals from governments. 
• Invest in networks and seek allies. While 
collaboration is not always easy, network-building 
and peer-to-peer collaboration are essential 
elements in bolstering HRDs’ self-protection 
strategies. While networks require significant 
time and trust-building, they can be very effective 
in allowing activists to share knowledge and 
protection tactics grounded in local needs and to 
raise the alarm and respond jointly and collectively 
to attacks. Networks can also be mobilized to 
effect change. For instance, in Mexico, Freedom 
House organized a working group of legislators, 
journalists, and human rights defenders, coined the 
Grupo 73, to successfully push through legislation 
to federalize crimes against freedom of expression. 
Activists should take a “big tent” approach to 
network-building and reach out to journalists and 
activists who share similar vulnerabilities and 
can serve as important allies in efforts to seek 
protections and raise awareness about attacks. 
One conference participant even illustrated 
how, in the face of an attack, he appealed to an 
intermediary with access to the government to 
intercede on his organization’s behalf.
Implementers should: 
• Keep it simple. Digital security training is most 
successful when it is kept simple at the start, 
focusing on basic principles, then later introducing 
more sophisticated layers of protection for higher-
risk scenarios. If trainers, who by and large come 
from a technical background, share too many 
technical principles and tools at the onset, activists 
can easily get 
overwhelmed. 
Additionally, 
trainers should 
be realistic about 
on-ground needs 
and match the 
technology 
accordingly. 
For instance, 
introducing 
circumvention 
tools to activists that are operating in 
environments with very limited bandwidth may 
not be appropriate advice. Implementers and 
technologists should work together to simplify 
digital security tools and trainings to make these 
more user-friendly and less overwhelming for 
beneficiaries. Initiatives such as CommunityRED’s9 
efforts to revamp existing digital security tools 
to make them more user-friendly— which was 
showcased at the conference—is a good example. 
• Focus on the training, not the tools. Implementers 
should lobby donors to focus less on promoting 
the proliferation of new digital security tools and 
more on providing support for long-term training 
to responsibly assess which risks are run, which 
tools are needed, and disseminate existing tools 
and tactics to meet local activists’ needs and 
improve their security habits. Implementers should 
also work with activists to localize existing tools to 
the particular cultural, technological, and political 
contexts they face on the ground. An example of 
such an effort is Tactical Tech’s “Security in-a-box” 
toolkit for LGBT communities in the Middle East 
and North Africa region,10 which was presented at 
the conference. 
• Promote a holistic approach to security. 
Implementers are increasingly aware that HRDs 
and other activists are facing multifaceted threats 
and are in need of holistic security assistance and 
training to overcome physical, digital, psycho-social, 
and other vulnerabilities. Some steps have been 
taken by implementers to put together resources 
and trainings that take a holistic approach to 
security. Tactical Tech, Front Line, and others are 
currently engaged in a collaborative effort, still in its 
early stages, to establish materials, methodologies, 
and frameworks that engender holistic security 
interventions for HRDs.11 Protection International’s 
New Protection Manual for HRDs12 and IREX’s 
Securing Access to Free Expression (S.A.F.E.) 
initiative13 to build regional protection hubs, 
featured at the conference, similarly take a holistic 
approach to security. Implementers must continue 
to focus time and effort towards promoting a 
holistic approach to security for HRDs, such as 
creating and revamping materials and curricula 
to address all facets of security and by recruiting 
trainers who can coach HRDs on self-protection 
strategies to overcome all vulnerabilities, including 
psycho-social harm. They must also stress to 
donors the importance of supporting more 
12
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integrated protection strategies for HRDs, including 
incentivizing collaboration among different 
implementers with expertise in physical, digital, and 
psycho-social security.
• Practice what they preach. Surprisingly, many 
implementers and donors that support security 
assistance do not have proper security protocols in 
place in their own operations. If implementers are 
serious about promoting security for HRDs, they 
must change and systematize their own security 
protocols as well. In order to do so, however, 
implementers need to assign a dedicated person 
to review and institutionalize internal security 
protocols, including communications, travel, 
and other aspects of routine work that can put 
implementers and their local partners in danger. 
They should also analyze security realities country 
by country and build security protocols and 
contingency plans according to the security profile 
of each country in which they operate and have 
local partners.
• Get the message out. Many participants in the 
conference acknowledged that they realized the 
seriousness of the risks they face when they or 
someone close to them was under attack. If the 
human rights community is to get ahead of the 
curve, implementers need to spread the message 
about the importance of security. In addition to 
carrying out threat assessments and trainings 
for targeted activists, implementers must seek 
to reach a wider audience to raise awareness 
among HRDs and others about the very real risks 
they face and to promote protection strategies 
as part of HRDs’ overall efforts to strengthen 
their sustainability and resilience. One way to do 
so might be for implementers to collaborate on 
a campaign to sensitize populations and raise 
awareness about security globally with an aim 
towards changing behaviors over the long-term. 
An effective campaign would also need to secure 
buy-in from partners on the ground and from visible 
champions within the international community, 
and would be sensitive to the unique challenges 
and vulnerabilities faced by women HRDs.
• Share the knowledge. Although implementers 
acknowledge the danger of introducing digital 
security tools to activists without proper training 
and accompaniment, HRDs yearn for more 
centralized and easily accessible information 
about protection strategies in order to educate 
themselves and their networks. To address this 
need, implementers should encourage the creation 
of platforms to share common security tools, 
tactics, and resources and the establishment 
of referral networks to disseminate trusted and 
vetted information about security providers and 
emergency assistance options for local HRDs. For 
instance, in Mexico, Freedom House is mapping all 
emergency assistance providers in order to identify 
what kind of assistance is available and pinpoint 
where there is duplication or gaps. This map will 
allow Freedom House efforts to serve as a referral 
center for HRDs and journalists seeking emergency 
assistance throughout Mexico.
Donors should: 
• Walk the talk. If donors are serious about security, 
they must also change and systematize security 
protocols internally so as to ensure they are not 
the weakest link in interactions with activists 
(including both online and offline interactions). 
Doing so would require introducing digital security 
protocols in what are oftentimes complex and 
archaic communications systems. As such, this 
effort would require aggressive advocacy by aid 
officials who are proponents of security to win 
buy-in from high-level government authorities. A 
common concern among activists in repressive 
environments deals with donors’ transparency-
related policies, which allow the public to request 
and scrutinize sensitive communications between 
donors and activists on the ground who may 
face reprisals for receiving foreign assistance 
or engaging with so-called foreign agents. Thus, 
walking the talk would also require donors to 
consult activists on “do no harm” principles, 
such as how best to engage them so as to avoid 
undermining their security. U.S. government and 
other donors that have more proactive policies 
in place to protect the identity of sensitive 
beneficiaries should also advocate to other 
donors to consider revising their transparency 
policies to take into account the security of 
beneficiaries. It may be possible to take advantage 
of existing Emergency Assistance Programs, 
such as Lifeline, Dignity for All, or others, to help 
coordinate among multiple donors to achieve 
and implement common security standards to 
be used by all donors in their communications 
with HRDs in areas of threat. Most importantly, 
donors must also walk the talk by elevating the 
importance of human rights as a fundamental 
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prescript for their development work. Doing so in 
a credible way means embedding human rights 
principles into all development programs, and 
engaging in forceful diplomatic challenges against 
authoritarian laws criminalizing foreign assistance. 
Donor agencies and foreign ministries should 
articulate coordinated strategies and messaging 
that reinforce the importance of human rights. Top 
officials should never shy away from espousing 
human rights as a core of foreign policy and 
development aid publicly, and in their talking points 
when engaging with repressive regimes.
• Invest in security. Donors should use funds as 
a tool to prioritize security, but to do so, they 
must also be realistic and provide assistance that 
recognizes the on-the-ground needs and realities 
of carrying out protection programming effectively. 
For instance, to understand local security needs, 
U.S. government donors should require country 
development officers and diplomatic desk 
officers to conduct risk assessments as part of 
the democracy, human rights and governance 
(DRG) assessments. Donors should coordinate 
among themselves to make it a common donor 
practice to integrate some level of appropriate 
security training into all relevant programming 
and ensure that grantees incorporate enhanced 
digital contracts and security elements into their 
agreement language. Donors should also be 
realistic and realize that networks are not built in 
a year, and that effective training requires layered 
relationship- and capacity-building. As such, they 
should invest higher levels of funding to support 
the recruitment of quality personnel (with higher 
consultant fees) that can provide a holistic 
approach to security. Donors should also provide 
multiyear funds to consolidate lessons learned 
and strategic planning, and allow for the long-term 
training and accompaniment that is necessary to 
effectively change behaviors and build resilience 
among HRDs.
• Stress the state’s responsibility to protect. U.S. 
government and other foreign donors should use 
coordinated bilateral engagements with countries 
in which HRDs and other targeted populations 
are under attack to stress the state’s responsibility 
to protect these populations. Donors should 
support existing protection mechanism models 
in countries such as Colombia, Mexico, and, most 
recently, Brazil and seek CSO input into these 
efforts to ensure they achieve credible results. In 
Mexico, U.S. assistance under the Merida Initiative 
was directed not only at security-sector reform 
but also at strengthening rule of law by bolstering 
the state’s protection mechanism for journalists. 
Similarly, foreign assistance to other countries 
should be conditioned on, and provide support 
for, their implementation of measures to protect 
targeted populations. For instance, governments 
in Africa and the Middle East that are highly reliant 
on foreign assistance, and face similar challenges 
protecting targeted populations like Mexico, should 
be encouraged to put protection mechanisms in 
place and dedicate the resources and personnel 
to make these mechanisms effective with the 
help of foreign technical assistance and capacity-
building. These efforts would also be in line with 
the recommendations of the latest Report of the 
UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human 
rights defenders,14 and, as such, the UN could be 
a potential donor in this effort. Donors should also 
work with judiciaries and other key institutions to 
tackle the root cause of HRD vulnerabilities, which 
is often rampant impunity. 
• Foster collaboration between government and 
private donors. Representatives from USAID 
and other key donors, including the U.S. State 
Department, the United Nations, Wellspring 
Foundation, and others, were present and active 
at the conference. Yet, more efforts are needed to 
engage and secure buy-in from government and 
private donors, as well as the corporate community, 
to bolster protections for HRDs, recognizing the 
role that each sector has to play and their relative 
interests in protecting and advancing fundamental 
freedoms. In an era of austerity, pooling resources 
and picking priorities will be critical in efforts to 
encourage collaboration among government and 
private donors. Government and private donors 
should hold regular but (for security purposes) 
confidential donor forums to know what each 
donor is doing and how protection efforts can 
be complementary, as not enough of this is 
happening both within government aid agencies 
and ministries and between government and 
private donors. Multilateral donors, such as the 
UN, World Bank, regional development banks, 
and others, should be brought into conversation, 
particularly on how to promote complementarity, 
and work together to combat the growing wave 
of restrictions against foreign funding for HRDs 
and CSOs in repressive countries. U.S., Canadian, 
Dutch, Swedish, Norwegian, and other government 
14
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donors with more forward-leaning policies on 
human rights assistance should also engage in 
hard and honest talks with other donors about 
taking a more proactive stance on supporting and 
protecting HRDs and tackling widespread CSO 
restrictions, including foreign funding restrictions. 
• Incentivize collaboration among implementers. 
Donors should promote collaboration among 
implementers, including non-profits and the 
private sector, to find joint and innovative solutions 
to the security threats that HRDs face. Donors 
should host private networking opportunities to 
bring implementers with diverse expertise and 
comparative advantages together so they can 
not only learn from one another about protection 
strategies but also engage in matchmaking 
on future collaborations. Donors should also 
incentivize collaboration in how they structure 
funding, including by providing higher levels of 
funding or higher thresholds for administrative 
costs, for proposals from consortia. Although 
donors prefer to concentrate their funding in 
well-established international CSOs, it is important 
that collaborative mechanisms involving the 
delegation of significant responsibilities and 
funding to local or regional CSOs be encouraged, 
perhaps through innovative and well-managed 
 consortium approaches.
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Reference Guide
Tools showcased at the conference:
 ■ Google, UProxy, www.google.com/ideas/projects/uproxy/ 
 ■ Tactical Technology Collective, Tools and tactics for the LGBT community in the Arabic region, 
https://securityinabox.org/en/context/01 
 ■ Civil Rights Defenders, Natalia Project, http://natalia.civilrightsdefenders.org/ 
 ■ IREX, S.A.F.E. Initiative, http://www.irex.org/project/safe-securing-access-free-expression
 ■ NDI, Level Up, www.ndi.org/democracy-and-technology 
 ■ CommunityRED, Simplifying Digital Security Apps, www.communityred.org/ 
 ■ Videre Est Credere, Safe and Secret Recording of Abuses, www.videreonline.org/
 ■ Freedom House/International Center for Journalists, Crowdsourced Map of Attacks against 
Journalists, https://periodistasenriesgo.crowdmap.com/ 
 ■ Factual, Hancel, http://hanselapp.com/indexEN.html 
 ■ Protection International, New Protection Manual for HRDs, http://protectioninternational.org/
publication/neaw-protection-manual-for-human-rights-defenders-3rd-edition 
Other resources available:
 ■ Freedom House, Emergency Assistance Funds,  
www.freedomhouse.org/program/emergency-assistance-programs#.UvPlKfldVg0 
 ■ Freedom House/CommunityRED/Front Line Defenders/KheOps/Internews International/ISC, 
UVirtus, www.uvirtus.org/ 
 ■ Internews International, www.internews.org 
 ■ Information Security and Capacity Project, iscproject.org, info@iscproject.org
 ■ Tech4Net, help@tech4net.org
 ■ Google, Good to Know, www.google.com/goodtoknow/ 
 ■ Amnesty International, Panic Button, https://www.amnesty.org/en/news/
amnesty-international-app-protecting-activists-technology-award-2013-05-22 
 ■ Google, Digital Attack Map, www.google.com/ideas/projects/digital-attack-map 
 ■ Tactical Tech, Security in-a-box, https://securityinabox.org/ 
 ■ Front Line Defenders, Digital Security, http://frontlinedefenders.org/digital-security
 ■ Committee to Protect Journalists, Journalist Security Guide,  
http://cpj.org/reports/2012/04/journalist-security-guide.php
 ■ UN, Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity, http://www.unesco.org/new/
en/communication-and-information/freedom-of-expression/safety-of-journalists/un-plan-of-action/
 ■ Humanitarian Practice Network, Operational Security Management in Violent Environments,  
www.odihpn.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&layout=item&id=3159
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